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Introduction   
  Despite the explosion of interest in industry clusters, formal studies evaluating the 
impacts of firm agglomeration on industry performance remain relatively scarce.  
Important exceptions include Gibbs and Bernat (1997) and, more recently, Gabe (2004 
and 2008) and Graham and Kim (2008).  Previous research has focused primarily on 
identifying and measuring industry clusters (e.g., Porter, 2003, Goetz, Shields, and Wang, 
2008), or on assessing factors underlying their formation (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; 
Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr, 2007).  In the food and agricultural sector, Roe, Irwin, and 
Sharp (2002) and Davis and Schluter (2005) directly or indirectly quantify 
agglomerations effects in spatial hog production trends and new food manufacturing 
investments.   However, considering that Porter (1998) used the California wine industry 
in his seminal work, the rarity of empirical work is especially glaring in the food and 
agricultural sector, and even more so for organic produce, which despite a growing 
importance is itself an under-researched component of the food system.  The agricultural 
sector is particularly relevant for agglomeration research because food production and 
distribution are closely tied to space.   In other words, the consequences of 
agglomerations in which buying and selling firms both compete and cooperate with one 
another as a result of proximate locations may be especially critical for food and 
agricultural firms.   
In addition to the issue of measuring agglomeration impacts, important questions 
remain about the definition and measurement of clusters in agriculture and in other 
industries, and how these affect performance measures.  Unresolved and largely 
unstudied is just how many firms and what geographic space should define a cluster, or 2 
 
how this cluster variable should be specified.  Gabe (2004), for example, follows a line of 
research that measures industry agglomeration as an industry intensity variable and 
compares a region’s particular industry concentration with the national average.  In 
addition, Gabe (2004) investigates the implications of measuring this intensity variable 
on a county or municipality level. Alternatively, Cainelli (2008) measures agglomeration 
as a binary indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm belongs to an officially 
defined Italian business district.  This almost purely empirical issue of cluster 
identification could be expected to a strong factor when measuring the impact of clusters 
in the organic industry.  In our study, the agglomeration measure is a binary variable (like 
Cainelli 2008) that takes the value 1 if some minimum number of similar firms is present 
within a specific geographic area.  Unlike other studies, however, we investigate the 
implications of agglomeration impacts from specifying alternative minimum numbers of 
firms within an industry cluster.   
Economic Clusters in the Organics Industry 
This study targets the certified organic “handling” sector, which lies between 
production and retailing.  Organic handlers are firms that serve as packers, shippers, 
manufacturers, processors, or brokers, distributors, and wholesalers.  According to 
Dimitri and Oberholtzer (2008), markets in this industry grew rapidly, increasing 17 
percent a year between 1995 and 2006.  While this growth reflects the potential for 
increased profits in the organic handling sector, it may simultaneously lead to industry 
growing pains as supply chains continually shift to accommodate more organic 
production and consumer demand.  Within this shifting supply chain (or market channel) 
in which organic firms face the competitive challenges of a high-growth sector, firm 3 
 
clusters could have a positive or negative impact on firm performance depending on 
whether cooperative or competitive forces dominate.   
Very little empirical research is available to guide our operating definition of 
industry clusters among organic handlers.  Figure 1, reproduced from Dimitri and 
Oberholtzer (2008, p. 12) shows the geographic dispersion of certified organic handlers.  
The map uses U.S. zip codes to cluster firms, and the number of organic firms within a 
single zip code ranges from zero to over ten.  Our preliminary results showed little 
difference from using zip codes or counties, but more differences when the 
agglomeration variable varies with the number of firms in a cluster.  More specifically, 
we use U.S. counties as the cluster boundaries and explicitly investigate how the number 
of firms within a boundary affects the estimated impacts of a firm cluster.   
Our effort to explore various definitions of firm clusters is secondary, however, to 
our primary goal of quantifying the impact of a cluster on firm decisions or firm 
performance.  Using data from a population survey of U.S. certified organic handlers 
(Dimitri and Oberholtzer 2008), we investigate the impact of clustering on several firm-
level variables that reflect firms’ performance and their marketing or procurement 
decisions.  These firm-level variables include the following:  total gross sales per 
employee, total gross sales, total number of full-time employees, the percentage of 
handlers’ sales total sales that is organic, the percentage of handlers’ total procurement 
that is organic, and the percentage of organic products sold or procured locally, 
regionally, nationally, or internationally.   
Before we can estimate the impact of clusters on these firm-level variables, our 
empirical investigation has several preliminary steps.  The first step is to operationalize 4 
 
the definition of a firm cluster.  Here, we find little difference from using zip codes or 
counties; we do, however, find important differences when the definition of a cluster 
depends on the number of firms in a cluster.
1  Our second step is to account for potential 
endogeneity in the cluster variable by estimating a cluster-formation equation where the 
formation or presence of a cluster, from the firm’s perspective, is a binary dependent 
variable.  Our third step is to estimate the impact of a cluster’s presence, along with other 
exogenous factors, on the firm-level output variables mentioned above.  Because cluster 
impacts are conditional on cluster formation, which is itself endogenous, we model 
cluster formation as a treatment effect and estimate the second and third steps 
simultaneously following the maximum-likelihood methods outlined in Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005, Chapter 25).  Our last step is to replicate these system estimations after 
varying the minimum number of firms that define a cluster.   
Our results confirm that the presence of a firm cluster often does have a 
significant impact on firm-level performance or decision variables.  For example, 
clustered firms have more than $1 million in additional sales per-employee.  In addition, 
the results from our last step show that the impact of clusters on firm performance and 
other firm decisions is sensitive to the minimum number of firms chosen to define a 
cluster.  When a firm cluster is defined as a three or more organic firms located within a 
county, for example, clusters positively impact a firm’s total gross sales.  However, when 
the cluster is defined using a larger minimum number of firms (e.g., nine or more organic 
firms within a county), then a cluster’s presence negatively impacts a firm’s total sales.  
                                                 
1 We eventually present estimated econometric models using a county-based definition of a cluster because 
more socio-economic data are available at the county level than the zip code level. 
 5 
 
These results and others, along with some robustness checks, are presented and discussed 
following a more formal presentation of our methods and data. 
Model and Methods 
In this section, we develop an econometric model where an equation that describes 
cluster formation is linked to an equation that describes the impact of clusters on firm 
performance or firm decisions.   Our model characterizes a cluster’s impacts as a 
treatment effect (see for example Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), where cluster formation is 
endogenous and therefore its effect on firm performance may be subject to selection bias.  
Modeling cluster impacts first, we let y
j
i denote firm-level decision j of firm i or an 
indicator of firm i’s performance, and we allow this variable to depend on the presence of 
a firm cluster, Cn, and other controlling factors, x, so that 
(1)      y
j
i = a Cn,i  + xi¢b b b b1 + e1i ,    
where b b b b1 are the estimated coefficients on the controlling factors, x¢b b b b1 takes a linear form 
by assumption, e1i is an error term described below, and a is the impact of firm clustering 
on yj.  In the estimated models that follow, we assume that j takes on a number of forms 
to reflect J different firm-level decisions or performance measures.
2  Controls in the x 
vector are variables that describe the function of firm i or the demographic surroundings 
of firm i.  Described this way, (1) is not intended to represent a structural equation that 
describes a firm’s optimizing behavior.   Rather, it explains variations in observed 
differences in performance measures or output variables that might come from 
optimizing behavior.
3 
                                                 
2 In most of the following discussion, the index j will be suppressed to reduce the notational burden. 
3 While equation (1) is admittedly ad hoc in nature, it could be thought of as analogous to an output supply 
equation obtained by applying Hotelling’s lemma to a restricted profit function of the form π(w, p; Cn, x, z), 
where w and p are input and output prices, and Cn, x, and z are treated as fixed factors.  To make the 6 
 
The binary cluster variable relevant to firm i, Cn,i, is modeled as the outcome of an 
unobserved latent variable, C*n,i.  Both the observed and latent variables are indexed by n 
to imply that the definition of a cluster depends on the minimum number of firms defined 
to make up a cluster.  We assume that C*n,i  is a linear function of a second set of 
controlling factors, z, which are based on Goetz (1997) and some of which may overlap 
with x, so that 
(2)      C*n, i  =  zi¢b b b b2 + e2i , 
and the observed cluster variable is  
(3)      ,     
1,         , 
    0
0,            
   . 
Because of the endogeneity of Cn,i and the possibility that cluster formation and cluster 
impacts may occur simultaneously, equations (1) and (3) are estimated jointly.  The error 
terms e2i and e2i are bivariate normal with mean zero and covariance matrix 
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where F(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.   
  To examine the effect of firm clustering on the dependent variable y, we are most 
interested in estimating parameter a.  However, as Cameron and Trivedi (2005) explain 
for more general cases, the average effect of a firm cluster must take into account the 
                                                                                                                                                 
analogy to an output supply equation complete, w and p must vary proportionally across firms at any point 
in time, and must be estimated with cross-sectional data.   In that case, the proportional prices would be 
incorporated into an estimated constant term. 7 
 
endogeneity of clusters.  In other words, the average effect must account for potential 
selection bias and therefore, parameter r as well.  In our case, the average effect is the 
difference in the dependent variable conditional on whether a firm is in a cluster or not.  
Greene (2008, p. 890) shows that this average effect of a cluster on the dependent 
variable is: 
(5)         |      1        |      0           
    ′β β β β  
    ′β β β β         ′β β β β     , 
where f(.) is the standard normal density function.
4  From (5), one can see that a would 
provide an appropriate estimate of the cluster effect if r = 0, which occurs if the cluster 
formation and the cluster effect equations are independent.  On the other hand, if r is 
positive, then a would underestimate the cluster effect. 
  Established theories on agglomeration and regional development provide little 
guidance for identifying elements of x, z, or even the best choices of for the dependent 
variable, y
j
i.  In prior empirical research, two choices for the dependent variable include 
the change in output (Cainelli 2008), and investment per worker (Gabe 2004).  In our 
study, y
j
i represents total gross sales, total employees, total sales per employee, and ten 
other firm-level variables available from the dataset described in the next section. 
  Choices for elements of x and z can be more problematic.  For research based on 
the estimation of structural equations (e.g., Graham and Kim 2008, and Cainelli 2008), 
the choice are somewhat clear.  For non-structural model estimation, however, there are 
more choices.  Roe, Irwin, and Sharp (2002) list seven categories of variables in their 
estimatable model:  (i) the agglomeration variable, (ii) urban encroachment and 
                                                 
4 The statistical software package Stata (release 10.0), which is later used for estimation, describes the same 
formula but also allows one to estimate the left-hand side of equation (5) directly by recovering the 
predicted values of y, conditional on the cluster variable being equal to zero or one. 8 
 
population characteristic variables, (iii) input availability variables, (iv) firm productivity 
and specialization variables, (v) local economic variables, (vi) market access variables, 
and (vii) regulatory variables.  Our study uses the first five categories, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), 
and (v), to help identify available data that can be used for elements of x and y.  These 
categories are identified on the list of variables found in Table 1.   
Data 
  Much of our data comes from a 2004 survey of certified organic handlers 
administered by USDA’s Economic Research Service.  Dimitri and Oberholtzer (2008) 
describe in detail the survey methodology and results.  The survey included questions on 
firm characteristics as well as marketing and procurement practices.  For each firm 
surveyed, we used county codes to identify firm clusters.  For example, using one 
definition, firm i was said to be in a cluster if at least two additional certified organic 
handlers from the survey were located in the same county.  In this example, n = 3, so if 
firm i is part of this cluster, then C3,i = 1. 
In addition to survey data, we also collected data from the U.S. Census of 
Agriculture to help describe the economic conditions found in an individual firm’s county.   
Table 1 lists and describes the variables from both the USDA survey and Census data 
used in our analysis.  In total, 316 firms in the survey have a complete set of data for all 
the variables listed in Table 1.
5  Several of the variables listed in Table 1 are the result of 
minor manipulations of the original handler survey data.  For example, in the original 
survey, organic handlers were asked to prioritize the “Availability of year-round supply” 
                                                 
5 The results that follow fix the sample size at 316, the minimum sample size where valid observations for 
variables used in all the estimated models.  Because survey response varied across the 13 questions that 
generate the different dependent variables used in these models, an alternative approach is to let the sample 
size “float” for each of the estimated models.  When we used this approach, we found that the results were 
not substantially different from the results presented here. 9 
 
and were given four choices: High Priority, Medium Priority, Low Priority, and No 
Difference.  Responses to this question were converted to a binary variable that equals 1 
if the firm answered High Priority or Medium Priority, and 0 otherwise.  In the case of 
one question in particular, Total Gross Sales, we imposed a substantial change to the raw 
data.  The sales question in the USDA survey asked organic handlers to describe their 
total annual gross sales by picking from among a list of seven sales-range categories.  In 
our current analysis, we transform this categorical variable to an integer by using the 
midpoints of the sales categories.  The conversion for the highest sales category (over 
$100 million) is chosen as 1.5 times the cutoff ($150 million).  We also created a 
productivity or output efficiency variable by dividing this new total sales variable by a 
firm’s number of full-time employees.  Much of the survey-based data in Table 1 is 
described in Dimitri and Oberholtzer (2008), although our smaller sample size may lead 
to some discrepancies in mean values.  Additional county-level data comes from the 
Census of Agriculture and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
We identify 31 variables from the organic handler survey that might be expected 
to influence firms’ decisions or performance and help control for impacts not due to the 
presence of a firm cluster. These variables form the basis for the x and z vectors.
6  In all 
cases, these variables fit within categories used by Roe, Irwin, and Sharp (2002).  Table 1 
identifies each variable with a particular category.   
Upon examination of Table 1, one can see that more than half of the 316 firms are 
part of clusters if we use the C3 definition.  Alternatively, only 21.5 percent of the total lie 
in a cluster if 10 is chosen as the minimum number of clustering firms (C10i).  Organic 
                                                 
6 Greene (2008) notes that joint ML estimation of the system can be complicated by identification issues.  
For this reason, we are careful to include some elements of  x and z that are unique to each vector. 10 
 
sales are mostly national (38.7 percent) or regional (29.8 percent); organic procurement, 
however, is split almost evenly among local, regional, national and international sources.   
Table 1 also shows that most firms function as manufacturers or processors, and the 
average is around 71.8 percent.  While 16.8 percent of the total sample handle organic 
manufactured products related to grain or oilseed milling, only 5.1 percent of the total 
relate to animal slaughtering or processing.  More than 60 percent of the firms in the data 
place a high or medium priority on procuring supplies locally, and more than 70 percent 
of the total use contracts for procurement.   
Results and Discussion 
Thirteen dependent variables listed in Table 1, along with each of the eight cluster 
variables, are estimated in Maximum Likelihood systems represented by equations (1), 
(2), and (3).  Because reporting 104 separate ML estimation results is impractical, we 
present instead a small illustrative selection of results.
7  First, we select one particular 
cluster variable, C6, chosen because its criterion of requiring at least six organic firms to 
define a cluster is in the middle of our range of examined definitions.  Second, for 
presentation purposes, we select one individual firm-level performance variable, total 
sales per employee, which is chosen because it provides the clearest measure of firm 
efficiency available from our data.  Table 2 presents the full ML results for this two-
equation system.  Near the bottom of Table 2, one sees that the estimate for r is positive 
and a Chi-square test strongly suggests that the two error terms from (1) and (2) are in 
fact correlated.  Thus, OLS estimation of (1) would lead to significant bias if the 
recovered estimate for a were used by itself to calculate the effect of firm clusters on 
                                                 
7 A full set of results for the 104 systems is available from the authors.  Tables 3 and 4 draws from all 104 
systems to summarize the impact of clusters on various firm decisions, and illustrates how this impact is 
sensitive to the definition of a firm cluster.   11 
 
sales per employee.  In addition to the results for one particular system estimation, we 
summarize select results from all 104 systems in Table 3, which presents the 104 
estimates of a.
8 
i. Cluster Formation 
  The first numeric column of Table 2 presents the ML results that reflect how firm 
characteristics and economic conditions influence the formation of a six-firm cluster of 
organic handlers.  Nine of the 30 coefficient estimates (excluding the constant term) are 
found to differ significantly from zero.  Four of the nine describe firm functions or 
specialization:  Firms that function as a broker, and firms that have both production and 
handling functions, are less likely to be in a cluster.  On the other hand, firms functioning 
as packers or shippers, and independent firms with only one facility are more likely to be 
in a cluster.  Three other of the variables with significant impacts generally describe input 
availability:  The number of small farms in a county has a positive impact on clustering, 
while a firm’s priority for year-round supplies and a firm’s total number of organic 
suppliers both have a negative impact on clustering.  Finally, two demographic 
variables – population and the percent of the population with college degrees – both have 
a positive impact on clustering.
9   
  Taken collectively, several of these results provide insight into the potential 
positive and negative tradeoffs from firm clustering that stem from competitive and 
cooperative behavior.   Firms with many organic suppliers may feel disadvantaged in a 
cluster because of increased competitive pressures.  On the other hand, independent one-
                                                 
8 Actually, Table 3 presents only 101 estimates of a because a joint ML estimation of the two-equation 
system fails to converge in three instances.  While a two-step procedure is successful in recovering 
estimates of a, these results are omitted in Table 2 to preserve a more direct comparison of estimates. 
9 Though not presented in Table 2, similar results generally hold when the clustering definition, Cn, varies 
for n = 4, 5, 7, and 8.      12 
 
facility firms may find advantages if clustering firms can increase scope economies 
through cooperation.  Firms that produce as well as handle, however, may see less need 
for cooperation and therefore be less inclined to cluster.    
ii. Impacts of Clusters on Firm Efficiency 
   The second numeric column of Table 2 shows how the cluster variable, C6, and 
other factors impact firm efficiency as measured by sales per employee.  First and 
foremost one should see that the coefficient on C6 is negative and significant.  By itself, 
this estimate would lead one to believe that firm clusters have a detrimental effect on firm 
efficiency.  However, as equation (5) shows, and as we discuss below, the true estimate 
of the average effect of clusters must take into account the impact of sample selection 
bias.   
  Apart from the cluster variable, eight of the other 25 coefficient estimates 
(excluding the constant) are statistically significant.  All else equal, firms with multiple 
locations are more efficient than the single-location firms, as are firms that self-identified 
themselves as large.  Food manufacturers/processors and packer/shippers are less 
efficient than firms with other functions.  And firms that experienced shortages of organic 
ingredients ended up being more efficient than firms that did not.  Finally, firms located 
in more populated counties and in counties with higher nonfarm per capita income are 
also more efficient.  Some of these results may suggest productivity gains from 
specialization or returns to scale.  Others may suggest gains from a stronger labor pool.   
iii. Impacts of Clustering on Additional Firm Decisions 
  Tables 3 and 4 present results from all 104 estimated ML systems showing  (i) the 
coefficient estimates for a in each case, and (ii) the selection bias-adjusted average effect 13 
 
from clusters for the wider range of firm-level decision variables or firm performance 
measures.   Table 3 shows that the estimated a is statistically significant in most models 
(i.e., in 57 out of 101 ML estimations that converged).  It also shows that the sign and 
level of significance can vary across the two dimensions depicted in the table:  variation 
in the dependent variable, and variation in the minimum number of firms used to define a 
cluster.  An extreme example of this variation is found in the system with the dependent 
variable “Organic procurement – % local”, which captures the percentage of total organic 
procurement that is done at a local level.  For this case, Table 3 shows that the estimate 
for a is positive and significant when a three-firm cluster is used (C3), but negative and 
significant when an eight- or nine-firm cluster (C8 or C9) is used.  Looking at all 104 
cases, however, Table 3 shows that when the estimate for a is statistically significant, the 
sign of a is generally stable.   
  Table 4 uses recovered estimates of a plus estimates for r and other recovered 
information to calculate the average cluster effect, accounting for selection bias, given by 
equation (5).   The first row of Table 4 shows the average impact of clusters on total 
gross sales per employee.  Note that for the C6 column, Table 4 shows that a firm cluster 
(defined with a six firm minimum) leads to an average gain of $1.32 million in increased 
sales per employee.  This positive value for a cluster’s impact contrasts with the 
corresponding negative estimate of a reported in Tables 2 and 3.  Following equation (5) 
for this example, a positive estimate for r helps overcome a negative estimate for a.   
This finding suggests that firms that are naturally more likely to benefit from clusters do 
in fact seek out clusters.  A good example of this effect, mentioned in the discussion of 
Table 2, concerns firms that are independent with a single organic facility.  These firms, 14 
 
apparently, choose to cluster, and in turn expect the cluster to provide efficiencies in 
scope that would otherwise be unavailable to an independent firm.    
  Table 4 furthermore shows that firm clusters have a positive (i.e., beneficial) 
impact on sales per employee.  Clusters also have a positive impact on a firm’s 
percentage of organic sales and organic procurement.  Clustering positively impacts the 
percentage of sales and procurement in local markets, while negatively impacting the 
percent of sales and procurement in national markets.  Perhaps the most noticeable 
impacts concern procurement decisions.  The presence of a cluster increases the organic 
component of total procurement by as much as 37.2 percent (in column 10); it increases 
organic procurement made locally by as much as 23.4 percent (in column 6); and it 
decreases procurement from national markets by as much as 32.5 percent (in column 6). 
iv. Sensitivity of Impacts to Cluster size 
Table 4 also shows that the impacts from clusters are sensitive to the definitional 
size of a cluster.  A good example of this sensitivity concerns total sales per employee.  
When the minimum number of firms used in the cluster definition is small (e.g., n = 3) 
the impact is relatively small ($0.17 million).  However, this impact increases as n 
increases:  For n = 8, the average effect of a cluster is an additional $1.44 million sales 
per employee.  Other dependent variables show similar sensitivity.  For low values of n, 
the impact of clusters on full-time employees is somewhat minimal (ranging between 9.0 
fewer or 8.7 additional employees when n equals 3, 4, or 5), but the impact is more 
dramatic for higher levels of n.  When n = 10, for example, firms in a cluster have on 
average 93.6 fewer employees.  In several cases, the sign of the average impact changes 
as n changes:  For example, firms in a C5 cluster have $11.4 million more  in total gross 15 
 
sales than non-clustered firms, on average.  On the other hand, firms in a C9 cluster have 
$13.7 million less in total gross sales than non-clustered firms, on average.  In many 
instances, the cluster effect intensifies as the definitional number of firms in a cluster 
increases. 
v. Robustness of Results and Model Specification 
  In addition to experimenting with variations of the cluster definition based on the 
minimum number of firms, we also investigated several other specification issues to see 
how robust our results were.  First, instead of basing clusters on counties, we replaced 
county borders with the geographic boundaries that follow the first three digits of the U.S. 
zip codes.  Second, instead of fixing the sample size for estimation at 316 observations, 
we allowed the number of observations to vary for the estimation of the 104 ML systems.  
Because each system’s estimation relies on different dependent variables, and because 
not all questions in the USDA Economic Research Service’s survey were answered with 
the same frequency (see Dimitri and Oberholtzer 2008) we allowed the econometric 
software to pick the maximum number of observations for each estimation. And third, we 
experimented with subsets of the x and z vectors to estimate the ML systems.  More 
specifically, we removed some of the category (iv) dummy variables from equation (1) 
listed in Table 2, and also some elements of x that were potentially endogenous (such as a 
dummy variable for “Year-round availability priority”).  In all of the model specifications 
described by these cases, we found almost no substantial differences in our estimation 
results described by Tables 3 and 4.  These robustness checks, therefore, provide an 
increased sense of confidence.   16 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper expands the sparse literature that attempts to document the impacts of firm 
agglomeration (or firm clusters) on firm-level performance or firm-level decisions.   We 
investigate the certified organic handler sector, a specialized component of the middle 
part of the farm-to-table marketing chain.  To estimate the impacts from clusters, 
however, we have at least two preliminary tasks.  First, in an attempt to explore how firm 
clusters might be defined, we allow the definition of a cluster to vary by the minimum 
number of similar firms present in a geographic area.  Second, we draw on the treatment 
effects literature to estimate clusters’ impacts only after accounting for possible 
endogeneity in the formation of clusters.   
While our study confirms that endogeneity often is an issue that could bias results, 
our most important findings confirm that firm clusters have significant impacts in the 
organic handling sector.  The exact measurement of clusters’ impacts, however, depends 
on how a firm cluster is defined.  For example, significant impacts on sales per employee 
range from an additional $0.17 million to $1.47 million, depending on whether a small or 
large number of firms is used as the minimum number to define a firm cluster.   
Taken collectively, our results also help shed light on the tradeoffs between 
competition and cooperation in the organic handling sector.  For this sector, our results 
suggest that cooperative forces may outweigh competitive forces.  For example, one 
might be tempted to speculate that organic handlers in a county-based cluster of at least 
seven or eight similar organic firms may be forced out of local markets for their 
procurement because of intense competitive pressures.  However, the opposite is true:  
clustered firms are more likely to procure locally.  At least two reasons could explain this 17 
 
finding.  First, as the firm agglomeration literature suggests, clustered firms attract 
organic production and create a strong local economy that can support a large cluster.  
Second, clustered firms in our data may be heterogeneous enough to create sufficient 
synergies in operations, thereby using other firms to create economies of scope.  In other 
words, one possible explanation for the positive impact of clusters is that these organic 
handlers are middlemen who buy and sell from each other, thereby allowing more 
specialization to occur.    
The above discussion notwithstanding, intense competition is still evident in our 
results, particularly when the definition of a firm cluster is based on a large number of 
firms.  For example, firms in a large cluster may have, on average 75 to 95 fewer 
employees than other firms.  It is interesting to note, however, that the same clustered 
firms (using a C9 cluster definition, for example) see sales per employee increase by 
$1.47 million while the total number of employees decreases by 74.9 employees.  Here, 
the competition for labor may be so intense that firms have adjusted their operations to be 
less labor intensive and more output efficient.   
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Data Used in the Empirical Models 
 
Variable  Description/ 
Units 
Min.  Mean  Max. 
Endogenous Cluster Variables: Cn         
  C3  (i)  0,1  0  0.560  1 
  C4  (i)  0,1  0  0.472  1 
  C5  (i)  0,1  0  0.411  1 
  C6  (i)  0,1  0  0.332  1 
  C7  (i)  0,1  0  0.313  1 
  C8  (i)  0,1  0  0.275  1 
  C9  (i)  0,1  0  0.247  1 
  C10  (i)  0,1  0  0.215  1 
 
Endogenous Firm-level Variables:  y 
       
  Total gross sales per employee  $  500  557,682  20 mil. 
  Total gross sales  $  250,000  13.3 mil.  150 mil. 
  Total full-time equivalent employees  #  0.25  55  750 
  Percentage of organic procurement  %  0.05  43.887  100 
  Percentage of organic sales  %  0  40.961  100 
  Organic sales – % local (w/in 1 hour)  %  0  24.081  100 
  Organic sales – % regional (bordering states)  %  0  29.768  100 
  Organic sales – % national  %  0  38.675  100 
  Organic sales – % international  %  0  7.608  100 
  Organic procurement – % local  %  0  23.019  100 
  Organic procurement – % regional  %  0  29.816  100 
  Organic procurement – % national  %  0  24.312  100 
  Organic procurement – % international  %  0  22.821  100 
 
Exogeneous Variables (x) and category 
       
Multiple locations* (iv)  0,1  0  0.250  1 
Manufacturer/processor* (iv)  0,1  0  0.718  1 
   Wholesaler/distributor*  (iv)  0,1  0  0.307  1 
   Broker* (iv)  0,1  0  0.076  1 
   Packer/shipper*  (iv)  0,1  0  0.184  1 
Years as a certified organic handler* (iv)  #  0  4.703  29 
Years in business* (iv)  #  1  26.27  138 
Certified organic producer and handler* (iii)  0,1  0  0.215  1 
  Animal food manufacturer* (iv)  0,1  0  0.092  1 
Grain or oilseed milling* (iv)  0,1  0  0.168  1 
  Sugar or confectionery products* (iv)  0,1  0  0.057  1 
Fruit or vegetable preserving*(iv)    0,1  0  0.146  1 
Dairy product manufacturing* (iv)  0,1  0  0.104  1 
  Animal slaughtering or processing *(iv)  0,1  0  0.051  1 
  Bakery or tortilla manufacturing* (iv)  0,1  0  0.070  1 
  Beverage manufacturing* (iv)  0,1  0  0.095  1 
Shortage of organic products (iii)  0,1  0  0.358  1 
Priority of choosing local suppliers* (iii)  0,1  0  0.601  1 
   Self-identified facility size* (iv)  1=small, 2=med., 
3=large 
1  1.465  3 
  #of farms with size 10-49 acres* (iii)  #  0  513.40         2,928  
  # of farms with size 50 acres or more* (iii)  #  0  60.36  522 21 
 
Table 1 (continued) 
 
       
Variable  Description/ 
Units 
Min.  Mean  Max. 
         
Exogeneous Variables (x) and category 
(cont’d) 
       
  Market value of land/building per acre* (ii)  $  136.00  5,731.54  48,159.00 
  Education - college*  (ii)  %  8.2  23.48  54.6 
  Nonfarm Income Per Capita* (v)  $     15.60    31.06    73.99  
  Population* (ii)  #       2,160    731,380.9    9,880,732  
         
Exogeneous Variables (z) and category         
  Recruits existing organic suppliers (iii)  0,1  0  0.465  1 
  Year-round avail. a main priority (iii)  0,1  0  0.661  1 
  Using contracts for procurement (iii)  0,1  0  0.725  1 
  Independent with 1 cert. organic facility (iv)  0,1  0  0.737  1 
  % procured from spot market (iii)  %  0  29.241  100 
 Total # of certified organic suppliers (iii)  #  0  12.541  750 
         
Number of complete observations = 316         
 
Notes:  
*  Exogenous variables in x marked with an * are also included in z.  
Categories for Cn,  x and z:  (i) firm agglomeration variable, (ii) urban encroachment and population 
characteristic variables, (iii) input availability variables, (iv) firm productivity and specialization variables, (v) 




 Table 2:  ML Results for Cluster Formation, C6, and Sales Per Employee 
(z-stats in parentheses) 
  Dependent Variables  
  C6 
Total Gross Sales 
per Employee 




Cluster (C6)  ---  -2.22x10
6** 
(-9.54) 




























Certified organic producer and 
handler 








































% procured from spot market  0.001 
(0.60) 
--- 
Total # of organic suppliers    -0.0.29*** 
(-12.74) 
--- 




Table 2 (Continued) 
 
  Dependent Variables  
  C6  Total Gross Sales 





Choosing local suppliers a 
priority  




Year-round availability a main 









Independent with one certified 
organic facility 
   0.505* 
(1.94) 
--- 




# of farms with size 10-49 
acres 































LR test r = 0:   c
2(1)=65.50, Prob > c
2(1) = 0.000 
 
Notes:  *** = statistically significant at the 99 percent level; ** at the 95 percent level; * at the 90 percent level. 24 
 
Table 3:  Signs of ML Estimates for a a a a, with Different Cluster Definitions  
 
  Clusters, Cn, where n = 3 to 10 
Dependent Variable  n = 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Total gross sales per employee 
   ($ millions)  +  –***  –***  –***  –***  –***  –***  nc 
Total gross sales 
   ($ millions)  +***  +***  –  –  –  +  +***  – 
Total full-time employees  +**  +*  +  +***  +***  +***  +***  +*** 
Percentage of organic sales  –**  –**  –*  –  –  –  –  – 
Percentage of organic procurement  –***  –*  –**  –**  –***  –**  –***  –*** 
Organic sales - % local  –***  –***  –  +  +  +  –  – 
Organic sales – % regional  +***  +**  +*  +  +  +  –  + 
Organic sales – % national  nc  –  –  +  +  +  nc  nc 
Organic sales – % international  –***  –***  –***  –***  –***  –**  +***  – 
Organic procurement – % local  +***  +  –  –  –  –*  –**  – 
Organic procurement – % regional  –**  –**  –**  –  –  –  –  –** 
Organic procurement – % national  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***  +*** 
Organic procurement – % internat’l  –**  –*  –**  –  –  –  –  – 
Notes:   
*** = a statistically significant at the 99 percent level; ** at the 95 percent level; * at the 90 percent level. 
nc = two-equation ML estimation did not converge. 
   25 
 
Table 4:  Average Firm-Cluster Effect Accounting for Selection Bias, with Different Cluster Definitions 
 
  Clusters, Cn, where n = 3 to 10 
Dependent Variable  n = 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Total gross sales per employee 
   ($ millions)  0.17  0.43  0.98*  1.32*  1.38*  1.44*  1.47*  nc 
Total gross sales 
   ($ millions)  3.24*  0.05*  11.4*  9.47  11.1  3.88  -13.7*  3.63 
Total full-time employees  8.7  -9.0  8.6  -53.7*  -50.4*  -79.0*  -74.9*  -93.6* 
Percentage of organic sales  6.3*  9.7*  8.4  11.8  12.8  6.1  11.6  17.5 
Percentage of organic procurement  8.3*  11.2*  8.9*  18.8*  24.5*  20.8*  27.2*  37.2* 
Organic sales - % local  9.0*  10.1*  9.3  8.7  7.7  5.6  7.9  11.3 
Organic sales – % regional  -7.7*  -10.1*  -9.1*  0.4  -3.7  -2.2  -3.6  0.3 
Organic sales – % national  nc  5.2  -0.5  -14.1  -7.4  -6.3  nc  nc 
Organic sales – % international  3.9*  4.9*  6.5*  3.1*  4.3*  2.9  -19.2*  -1.7 
Organic procurement – % local  2.8*  5.9  17.3  23.4*  23.3*  22.5*  20.6*  16.9 
Organic procurement – % regional  2.9*  1.0*  1.4  -0.7  -2.5  -9.9  5.0  12.8 
Organic procurement – % national  -20.9*  -23.5*  -26.8*  -32.5*  -30.4*  -28.3*  -24.3*  -26.1* 
Organic procurement – % internat’l  8.4*  12.6*  16.0*  15.4*  15.0*  18.0  5.3  9.6 
Notes:   
*= estimates of r are statistically significant at the 90 percent level or better. 
nc = two-equation ML estimation did not converge. 
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Figure 1:  The Geographic Dispersion of Certified Organic Handlers (Dimitri and 
Oberholtzer, 2008) 
 
 
 
 